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[Sac. No. 6654. In ~~nk. Mar. 7,1958.}

COUNTY OF ALPINE, AJipellant, v. COUNTY OF
TUOLUMNE et aI., RespoJldents.
[1] Counties - Boundaries - Dct.ermination - B1 Surve1.-Gov.
Code, 55 23171-23175, relatm, to lettlement of county boundary
disputes, provides a special remedy for the determination by
survey, by the State LuC.t Commission, of inadequately
marked boundary lines; mtl. IUney, when properly made and
finally approved, is conclusiTt 6f the subject lines and corners.
(Gov. Code, 528175.)
[2] Id. - Boundaries - DetenIIiI.aaIon-B1 Survey: B1 Oourts.The language of Gov. code;ti 23171-28175, relates to the "determination" of disputed boctiary lines only through the making of surveys to mark tht «nunty boundary lines defined by
Gov. Code, tit. 3, di\". 1, day. 2, art. 2 (§§ 28100-23158), not

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, CountieE., H 10, ll; Am.Jur., Counties, 5§ 8,
14,15.
McK. Dig. References: [1] C.~llLt;es, § 19; [2,3] Counties, 5519,
20; [4-6] Counties, § 20; [7,9,::: Counties, 517; [8] Administrative Law, § 2; [10] Administr&':..~ Law, 513.
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to define those lines by interpreting legislative language which
leaves uncertain the point where the survey shall start or the
courses it must follow; with respect to disputes of the latter
character, the legislative plan contemplates resolution by
judicial proceedings. (Gov. Code, §§ 23178, 51000-51009.)
(8] ld. - Boundaries - Determination-By Survey: By Oourts.Two procedures for determining county boundary lines are
provided in the Government Code, but the two methods are not
necessarily alternative in a given case; rather, §§ 51000-51099,
providing for judicial determination, may be invoked where
the language of the boundary statute is unclear as well as
where the line has been obliterated, while §§ 23171-23175, providing for a survey by the State Lands Commission when the
common boundary is "not adequately marked by natural
objects or lines, or by surveys lawfully made," are to be availed
of only where the language of the boundary statute is clear
and only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor in
adequately marking the line is required.
[i] .ld.-Boundaries-Determination-By Courts.-Where the lan·
guage used by the Legislature with respect to county boundaries is "indefinite or uncertain," construction of such language
is exclusively for the courts, and the location of the boundariss
is a question of fact to be judicially determined.
[6] Id.-Boundaries-Determination-By Courts.-While the fix·
ing and defining of county boundaries is a legislative function,
the interpretation of a statute so fixing such boundaries is a
judicial function, to be exercised by the courts.
[6] ld.-Boundaries-Determination-By Oourts.-In an action by
Alpine County against three other counties to determine boundaries, where the evidence disclosed that there were four
possible locations of the "Sonora trail," that the location of
the "West Point road" was similarly uncertain, and that the
uncertainty as to the true location of these points was the
cause of boundary disputes, which of the several possible
locations of markers was intended by the Legislature to delineate the boundaries of Alpine County was a fact question to
be determined by the courts; the State Lands Commission wail
not empowered to settle the boundary disputes.
[7&,7b] ld.-Boundaries-Powers of State Lands Oommission.The States Lands Commission is not empowered to determine
whether a boundary line has been fixed because of mutual use
and recognition within the meaning of Gov. Code, § 23170 or
§ 23177; the sole power conferred on it with respect to boundary lines is "to survey and mark" them, and this does not
include the power to make a prior determination that the
statutory line has been altered by mutual use and recognition.
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[8] Administrative Law-Agencies-Powers.-An administrative
agency can act only as to those matters which are within the
scope of the powers delegated to it.
[9] Oounties-Boundaries-Mutual Recognition.-The mutual recognition statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 23170, 23177) represent a codification of the common-law doctrine of acquiescence, and that
doctrine is properly invoked in fixing a boundary line whel'e
the true location is uncertain; where the location of a boundary Ilne is in dispute because of uncertainty or indefiniteness
in the statutory description, primary jurisdiction over the dispute is in the courts rather than the State Lands Commission.
[10] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Exhaustion of Ad·
ministrative Remedies.-The rules that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute relief must be sought before
the administrative body and such remedy exhausted before the
courts will act, and that it lies within the power of an administrative agency to determine in the first instance and before
judicial relief may be granted whether a given controversy
where the agency is given no jurisdiction to make a judicial
falls within the statutory grant of jurisdiction, are inapplicable
determination of the type involved.
[11] Oounties-Boundaries-Powers of State Lands Oommission:
Estoppel.-A county's erroneous request to the State Lands
Commission to determine disputed boundaries between counties
could not invest the commission with jurisdiction beyond that
conferred on it by law or estop the county from pursuing its
proper remedy.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action by one county against other counties for judicial
determination of boundary between it and defendant counties.
Judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to order sustaining
demurrer to amended complaint without leave to amend,
reversed with directions.
Ward H. Coffill and Jeremy C. Cook for Appellant.
[8] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 16.
[10) See Oa1.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 184 et seq. i Am.Jur.,
Public Administrative Law, § 197 et seq.
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James H. Phillips as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Ross A. Carkeet, Special Counsel (Tuolumne), Hardin &
Gorgas, James R. Hardin, Joseph S. Huberty, District Attorney (Calaveras), and Anthony A. Caminetti, Jr., District
Attorney (Amador), for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff Alpine County appeals from a
judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to an order sustaining
defendant counties' demurrers to the amended complaint without leave to amend. By its complaint Alpine seeks a judicial
determination of the boundary between it and defendant counties, and to restrain those counties from exercising jurisdiction
over certain territory alleged to he situated within the boundaries of Alpine. Each of the defendants demurred on the
grounds that the complaint does not state a cause of action,
that the court has no jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants or of the subject of the action, and that there is another
action pending between the parties for the same causes alleged
in the complaint. We have concluded that the complaint
states a cause of action for judicial interpretation of an unclear
boundary line statute, that the court has jurisdiction over
the matter, that the complaint does not show that any other
action is pending between the parties on a similar cause, and
that the judgment of dismissal should therefore be reversed.
The boundaries of Alpine County are defined in section
23102 of the Government Code as follows: "Beginning at
the north corner, at a point where the state line crosses
the east summit of the Sierra Nevada Mountains ... ; thence
southwesterly along said summit to a point two miles west
of James Green's house, in Hope Valley, called Thompson's
Peak; thence southwesterly in a direct line to a point on the
Amador and Nevada turnpike road in front of Z. Kirkwood's
house ... ; thence south across the north fork of the Mokelumne
River to the road leading from West Point, in Calaveras, to
Big Tree road, near the Big Meadows; thence easterly along
said West Point road to the Big Tree road; thence easterly
in a direct line to where the Sonora trail strikes the middle
fork of the Stanislaus River; thence easterly along said trail
to the summit of the Sierra Nevada Mountains; thence northerly along said summit of the dividing ridge between the
West Walker and Carson Rivers; thence northeasterly along
said dividing ridge to the state line •.. ; thence northwest
along said state line to the place of beginning."

Mar. 1958]
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By resolutions dated June 16, 1950, and July 21, 1950, the
Board of Supervisors· of Alpine County petitioned the State
Lands Commission to investigate and survey the problem of
a disputed boundary common to Alpine and Tuolumne Counties, and by resolution dated July 6, 1953, the same board
made the same request with respect to Alpine's common
boundaries with Amador and Calaveras Counties. The only
source of authority of the State Lands Commission to aet in
a matter of this type is section 23171 of the Government Code
read together with section 6204 of the Public Resources Code.
Section 23171 provides that" All common boundaries and
common corners of counties not adequately marked by natural
objects or lines, or by surveys lawfully made, shall be definitely established by surveys made jointly by the $Urveyors
of all the counties affected, and approved by the boards of
supervisors of the counties, or by a survey made by the State
Lands Commission, on application of the board of supervisors
of any county affected." Section 6204 of the Public Resources
Code states that "The [state lands] commission shall when
required, survey and mark the boundary lines of counties
and cities."
According to the subject pleading, the dispute as to the
boundaries here involved arose from two sources: (1) uncertainty as to the terminal point of the line running south from
Z. Kirkwood's house "to the road leading from West Point,
in Calaveras, to Big Tree road, near the Big Meadows"; and
(2) uncertainty as to the location of "the Sonora trail," as
those terms are used in the statutory boundary description of
Alpine.
Pursuant to the above mentioned requests of Alpine's Board
of Supervisors, the State Lands Commission undertook investigations and conducted hearings in an effort to determine the
true boundary line. Subsequently, certain findings adverse
to the position of Alpine were approved by the commission.
Alpine then instituted the present action, and the commission
suspended its proceedingS pending the outcome of this litigation.
In its complaint Alpine alleges that "there is, and for many
years last past has b~en, dispute and disagreement and uncertainty existing between" Alpine and Amador, Calaveras, and
Tuolumne Counties due to the above mentioned uncertainties
in statutory boundary descriptions; that the exact location of
the boundary lines in question "is in dispute and has never
been actually or judicially determined" ; that no survey mark-
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ing the lines at the disputed points "can be made until the
[uncertainties in location are] judicially determined"; that
defendant counties have been encroaching in certain specified
respects on the jurisdiction of Alpine County, over the protest
of Alpine, on certain portions of Alpine lying to the east
and north of the true boundary line; and that Alpine "has
no adequate remedy at law or by administrative process."
Alpine prays for a judicial determination of the western and
southern boundary lines of the county, and for a decree enjoining defendant counties from asserting jurisdiction over
the land areas lying east and north of the court-determined
line and from receiving or using funds from the United States
Forest Service based on acreage of national forest lands within
the disputed areas. As noted earlier, demurrers of Amador,
Calaveras, and Tuolumne Counties to tRis complaint were
sustained without leave to amend, and Alpine appeals from
the judgment of dismissal thereafter entered.
The crucial question presented is whether the courts have
any jurisdiction over the controversy in its present state,
or whether Alpine is precluded from judicial relief until the
administrative agency (the State Lands Commission) has
finally determined the issues tendered to it. We have concluded, for reasons hereinafter stated, that primary jurisdiction in this case rests in the courts, and that the courts
are not required to delay their proceedings until the commission has concluded its hearings.
Defendant counties contend that under the above quoted
provisions of section 23171 of the Government Code and section
6204 of the Public Resources Code, the State Lands Commission is granted the power to settle boundary disputes by
surveying and marking the true boundary line, and therefore
Alpine cannot seek judicial relief until the administrative proceedings requested by Alpine are concluded. [1] It is true
that in sections 23171-23175 of the Government Code the law
provides a special remedy for the determination by survey of
inadequately marked boundary lines. Such a survey, when
properly made and finally approved, is conclusive of the subject lines and corners. (Gov. Code, § 23175; People v. Boggs
(1880),56 Cal. 648.)
However, it is to he noted that sections 23171-23175 are
located in Government Code, title 3, division 1, dealing with
H Counties Generally." Article 2 of chapter 2 of that division
defines the boundaries of the several counties and is followed
by article 3 which relates to "Settlement of Boundary Dis-
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putes." Section 23171 is found in article 8 and, as hereinabove mentioned, provides that U All common boundaries and
common corners of counties not adequately marked by natural
objects or lines • • . shall be definitely established by surveys
..• " and section 23173, also in article 3, declares that "Upon
the reports made by the county surveyors the State Lands
Commission shall finally determine and establish the common
boundaries and corners, if it can collate a satisfactory description therefrom. If the reports are insufficient for the purpose,
it shall cause surveys to be made, and when approved by it,
the surveys establish the (!ommon boundaries and corners."
[2] It is manifest that the language of the sections above
quoted relates to the "determination" of disputed boundary
lines only through the making of surveys to mark tke bounda,."
lines defined by tke Legislature in article 2, not to define those
lines by interpreting legislative language which leaves uncertain the point where the survey shall start or the courses it
must follow.
In respect to disputes of the latter character (i.e., those
which involve not merely running a survey to mark legally
defined lines but, rather, conducting a proceeding to legally
define the lines so that thereafter they can be marked on
making a survey) it is clear from the language above quoted,
read in the context of related provisions, that the legislative
plan contemplates resolution by judicial proceedings. In this
connection, it is noted that section 23178 of article 3 provides
that "Whenever a common boundary ••. has been legally
established in accordance with Article 3 of this chapter, or by
judicial proceedings," etc. Furthermore, we find that in title
5, division 1, chapter 5, of the same code, dealing specifically
with "Boundaries" and proceedings to establish them, section
51000 provides that "When the location of a boundary line
of a local agency(1] is indefinite or uncertain, or the boundary
line has been obliterated from any cause, it may be determined,
defined, and established pursuant to this chapter." Section
51001 declares that "The .legislative body of the local agency
having an indefinite, uncertain, or obliterated boundary may
cause a proceeding to be brought in the name of the local
agency to have the boundary line determined, defined, and
established. " In the proceeding thus instituted, "The [superior] court shall determine the location of the boundary line
'The term "local .geuey" .. used in the subjeet portion of the code
refill W "county. eity. or city and count1" (GOT. Oode, 6 50001).

.J
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by courses and ·distances or by giving such other definite
description as is necessary or desirable." (Gov. Code, § 51007.)
After the court has determined the boundary line, a copy of
its judgment is filed with the Secretary of State (Gov. Code,
§ 51008), and "From the date of filing, the boundary line is
established and fixed for all purposes and constitutes the true
and official boundary line of the local agency" (Gov. Code,
§ 51009). Sections 51000-51009 of the Government Code were
derived from a statute first enacted in 1921 (Stats. 1921, chap.
838, p. 1607) which contained almost identical language. In
City of Crescent Oity v. Dodd (1933), 131 CalApp. 153 [21
P.2d 1401, it was held that this latter statute "furnishes a
full and complete remedy to cities [and counties], and by its
provisions allows a full and complete investigation as to indefinite or uncertain boundaries; allows the introduction of testimony and maps, and gives a direct method of determining
the true boundaries of cities, towns and counties," and under
such circUInstances .. a complete remedy is afforded" in the
courts.
. [3] Two procedures for determining boundary lines are
thus provided in the Government Code. However, while
section 23171 provides that the State Lands Commission may
make a survey, on request, when a common boundary is "not
adequately marked by natural objects or lines, or by surveys
lawfully made, " section 51000 provides for a judicial determination when the boundary is "indefinite or uncertain, or .•.
obliterated. " It thus appears that the legislative plan contemplates that the two methods are not necessarily alternative
in a given ease; rather, that the provisions of sections 5100051009 may be invoked where the language of the boundary ,
statute is unclear as well as where the line has been obliterated,
while the remedy provided by sections 23171-23175 is to be
availed of only where the language of the boundary statute
is clear and only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor
in adequately marking the line is required. [4] In other
words, where the language used by the Legislature is "indefinite or uncertain," construction of such language is a matter .
exclusively for the courts, and the location of the boundaries
is a question of fact to be judicially determined. (County of .
Sierra v. County 'of Nevada (1908), 155 Cal. 1, 18 [99 P.
371].) [6] The foregoing construction is in accord with:
the generally recognized rule that while the fixing and defining :
of county boundaries is a legislative function, the interpreta· .
tion of a statute so fixing such boundaries is a judicial func-
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tion, to be exercised by the courts. (Roy O. Martin Lumber
Co. v. Baird (1954),225 La. 14 [71 So.2d 865, 868] i Ballard v.
w. 2'. Smith Lumber Co. (1953),258 Ala. 436 [63 So.2d 376,
378 [3]] i 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 261, § 7.05.)
In the case of County of Sierra v. County of Nevada (1908),
fttpra, 155 Cal. 1, there was a dispute as to the boundary line
between Sierra and Nevada Counties. The boundary statute
there involved provided in pertinent part that the line ran
"west to the source of and down the South Fork and Middle
Yuba River." The dispute related to the location of the
"source of the South Fork." (P. 4 of 155 Oal.) No official
survey of the boundary between the two litigating counties
had ever been made. The trial court determined the location
in question and this court affirmed the judgment as based upon
substantial evidence.
It was eontended in the Sierra ease that under the provisions of sections 3969-3972 of the Political Code (now Gov.
Code, §§ 23171-23173,23175) a mode was Hfixed by the legislature whereby the boundaries of counties must be ascertained;
that this legal remedy must be exhausted before the matter
of conflicting boundaries can be presented for judicial determination in a court of equity. (People ex rei. Borrell v.
Boggs [(1880), supra], 56 Cal. 648.)" (County of Sierra v.
County of Nevada (1908), supra, 155 Cal. 1, 12.) The court
in rejecting such contention held (pages 13-15): "[I]t is
obvious that the question presented in the case at bar, and
the matter before the court in the ease cited, call for the
application of different principles of law. In the case cited
the court grounded its conclusion on the fact that the statute
defining the boundary had fixed the boundary line of the
counties as the summit of the dividing ridge, and that the
act which the code section directed the surveyor-general [the
predecessor of the State Lands Commission] to do with reference to the establishment of said boundary, was simply to go
on the ground and in his ministerial capacity run his lines
along the ridge. Of conrse, where the legisfature has fixed a
boundary along a ridge, a well-defined course readily determinable and ascertainable, there is no action on the part of
the surveyor-general ealled for but to run his survey line
thereon on the ground. Where the language of an act 80
clearly defines the line that there is nothing to be done but run
a survey along it, there is no room for question, but the
sections of the code relied on by appellant furnish a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy for the establishment of the
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line, and that a court of equity cannot be called upon
what the law in the first instance provided for having
But this legal remedy can only be availed of where
language of an act defining a boundary is clear. Where it
not clear, and where the description of the boundary is
doubtful import, or where it requires the interpretation of a
court to ascertain what is meant by the language of the
statute when mentioning localities, natural objects, or sources
of streams as matters of boundary, the sections of the code
have no application. . . • When the courts have interpreted
the language of the act, and declared what the
in dispute are as a matter of law, then only can surveyors or
the surveyor-general act, and they act then in establishing the
line on the ground solely in a ministerial capacity . • • What
the source of the South Fork is is not definitely fixed or determined by the act, and could only be determined by judicial
inquiry to ascertain its location. It is only upon its ascertainment that the line therefrom to the state line could be run, or
a surveyor be able to locate by survey the line called for.
If it could be said that it was purely a ministerial act of the
surveyor-general to ascertain from the language used in the
act this source and make his survey accordingly, it would
be difficult to conceive of a case where the language of an act
could be so uncertain or indefinite as to boundaries of a
county, or with reference to any point from which boundaries
were to be measured, so that a court of equity could be ever
invested with jurisdiction to construe the language of an act
and determine as matter of law what the boundaries intended
to be fixed by it were."
[6] The Sierra case appears indistinguishable from the
case at bar as to the pertinent issues involved. The record
in this case discloses that there are four possible locations
of the" Sonora trail," that the location of the "West Point
road" is similarly uncertain, and that the uncertainty as to
the true location of these points is the cause of the present
boundary disputes. Which of the several possible locations
of these markers was intended by the Legislature to delineate
the boundaries of Alpine County is a fact question to be
determined by the courts. It follows from the foregoing that
the State Lands 'Commission is not empowered to settle the
boundary disputes in this case, and that Alpine's action is
tenable. The complaint alleges the cause and nature of the
disputes, Alpine's interpretation of the language in question,
and the acts of defendant counties which_ are claimed to con-

i
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artitute infringements on Alpine's rights; such eomplaint states
a cause of action for the relief sought.
[7a] Defendant counties further urge that one of the duties
of the State Lands Commission is to determine whether a
boundary line has been fixed because of mutual use and recognition within the meaning of either section 231702 or section
23177 8 of the Government Code, and therefore that the courts
cannot in any event aet in this case until the commission has
completed its determination on this matter. This argument
also is untenable.
To begin with, the commission is not empowered to
determine the applicability of the mutual recognition statutes.
[8] An administrative agency can act only as to those matters
which are within the scope of the powers delegated to it.
(State Compo Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1942), 20
Ca1.2d 264, 266 [2] [125 P.2d 42) (Industrial Accident Commission); Wheeler V. City of Santa Ana (1947),81 Cal.App.
2d 811, 816 [1) [185 P.2d 373) (Civil Service Commission) ;
2 Cal.Jur.2d 30, § 16.) [7b] The powers delegated to the
State Lands Commission deal generally with title to and usage
of public lands, minerals and oil and gas on such lands, and
navigable waters of the state. (Pub. Resources Code, § 6216.)
Aside from section 6204 of the Public Resources Code (ante,
p. 791) no reference to city or county boundary lines is made
in the statutes establishing the commission and defining its
powers, and no power to fix or ascertain such boundaries with!
reference to usage and custom is expressly or impliedly con-l
ferred. (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 6101-6223; see also!
California Administrative Code, tit. 2, div. 3, ch. 1.) The sole
power conferred on the commission with respect to boundary
lines is to "survey and mark" them; the power to make a
prior determination that the statutory line has been altered
by mutual use and recognition is neither expressly nor impliedly included in the powers conferred, for such determina'Government Code, lection 2B170, provides as follows:
'" Every common boundary between counties which has been mutually
recognized and used by the counties adjacent thereto for the purpose of
assessment and collection of taxes for a period ot 25 years continuously
prior to July 30, 1927, is confirmed, validated, and declared to be legally
established.' ,
'Government Cpde, lootion 23177, provides al follows:
"Every common boundary between counties which has been mutually
used by the counties adjacent thereto for the purpose of the assessment
and collection of taxes for a period ot 15 years continuously prior to the
e1footive date of this seetion [September 22, 1951] is hereb7 confirmed,
nlidated, and declared to be lerally established."
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tion is not a necessary part of the ministerial function
surveying and marking.
[9] The mutual recognition statutes represent a coa:lDc~
tion of the common law doctrine of acquiescence. (See
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 274-276, § 7.09; Starry
Lake (1933), 135 Ca1.App. 677, 682 [28 P.2d 80].)
doctrine is properly invoked in fixing a boundary line where, .
as here, the true location of the line is uncertain. (City of·
Alameda v. City of Oakland (1926), 198 Cal. 566, 576 [2]
[246 P. 69].) But, as noted hereinabove, where the location
of a boundary line is in dispute because of uncertainty or
indefiniteness in the statutory description, primary jurisdiction over the dispute is in the courts rather than the administrative agency. Since the State Lands Commission has no·
primary jurisdiction in the case of a disputed boundary line
where the dispute is based upon an unclear definition in a
boundary statute, and since the applicability of sections 23170
and 23177 of the Government Code in this case is merely a
facet of a boundary dispute of the type mentioned, it follows
that the commission has no power to make any initial determination of the true boundaries here involved, whether based
on the mutual recognition statutes or otherwise.
[10] Defendants rely on the established rules that "where
an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must
be sought. before the administrative body and this remedy
exhausted before the courts will act" (Abelleira v. District
Court of Appeal (1941), 17 Ca1.2d 280, 292 [6] [l09 P.2d
942, 132 A.L.R. 715]), and that "it lies within the power of
the administrative agency to determine in the first instance,
and before judicial relief may be obtained, whether a given .
controversy falls within the statutory grant of jurisdiction"
(United States v. Superior Court (1941), 19 Ca1.2d 189, 195
[3] [120 P.2d 26]). But these rules are inapplicable where,
as here, the agency is given no jurisdiction to make a jUdicial
determination of the type involved. [11] Alpine's errone- .
ous request to the commission to determine the disputed
boundaries could not invest the commission with jurisdiction
beyond that conferred on it by law or estop Alpine from
pursuing its proper remedy.
Once the court has determined the boundaries here involved,
based either on a legal interpretation of the allegedly uncertain language contained in section 23102 of the Government
Code, or on the terms of the mutual recognition statutes if
such statutes are found to be applicable, and the facts as the
!.
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court may find them, then the State Lands Commission may
well have jurisdiction, if called upon, to proceed with its
survey and to mark the true line as judicially determined.
However, in accordance with the principles hereinabove enunciated, the initial determination of the boundaries in question
must be made by the courts, and it was error for the trial
court to have sustained defendants' demurrers without leave
to amend.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed and the
cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrers and permit the defendants to answer, if
they be so advised, within such reasonable time as the court
may fix.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Sections 23171-23175 of the Government Code provide an
administrative procedure and sections 51000-51009 of that
code provide a judicial procedure for determining disputed
boundaries. Plaintiff was therefore entitled in the first instance to invoke one procedure or the other. (Oity of SusanviUe v. Lee O. Hess 00., 45 Ca1.2d 684, 689 [290 P.2d 520] ;
Scripps Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Oalifornia Emp. Oom., 24
Ca1.2d 669, 673 [151 P.2d 109, 155 A.L.R. 360]; see River
Plate & Brazil Oonferences v. Pressed Steel Oar 00., 227 F.2d
60, 64.) Since it elected to proceed before the State Lands
Commission before this action was commenced, the trial court
correctly concluded that the alternative remedy was not available. When "two or more tribunals in this state have concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction
retains it to the exclusion of all other tribunals in which the
action might have been initiated .... One reason for the rule
is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise
if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards
at the same time or relating to the same controversy; another
reason is to protect litigants from the expense and harassment
of multiple litigation." (Scott v. Industrial Accident Oom.,
46 CaUd 76, 81-82 [293 P.2d 18].) The Scott case makes
clear that the rule is equally applicable when one of the
tribunals is an administrative agency. (See also Elbert v.
Johnson, 164 F.2d 421, 423-424; Majors v. Thompson, 235
F.2d 449, 452; United States v. Interstate Oommerce Oom.,
337 U.S. 426, 434 [69 s.Ot. 1410,93 L.Ed. 1451].)
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This rule makes good sense and should be followed in
present case. Pursuant to plaintiff's request, the State ........UWl.:J
Commission held extensive hearings and it has approved
ings that are sufficient to permit an accurate survey to be
made. By holding that it has no jurisdiction to resolve the
boundary dispute, the majority not only render the commission's work nugatory, but permit plaintiff to harass defendants
by compelling them to relitigate the dispute in another pro-'
ceeding after the tribunal first selected by plaintiff made
findings adverse to it. The orderly administration of justice
demands that plaintiff abide by its election. Having chosen
the administrative remedy, it must seek judicial relief by way
of review of the commission's decision, not by an independent,
action.
Government Code, section 23175, providing that" Any sur.
vey finally approved pursuant to this article is a conclusive
ascertainment of the lines and corners included in the sur·
vey," does not negate the right to judicial review of the
commission's action, for if review is available, approval of a
survey is not final until the commission's action has been
affirmed or the time for seeking review has elapsed. People v.
Boggs, 56 Cal. 648, is not to the contrary, for in that case
the survey was not attacked in a proceeding brought to review
the agency's action, but in a collateral proceeding brought
to recover taxes paid under protest. Moreover, Code of Civil
Procedure, section 1094.5, now expressly provides for the.
review of the commission's proceedings, even though it is not I
one of the agencies enumerated in the Administrative Procedure Act. (Gov. Code, § 11501.) "The framers of section
1094.5 intended it to set forth 'the procedure by which judicial
review can be had by the writ of mandate after a formal
adjudicatory decision by any administrative agency.' (Emphasis added; see Tenth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council
of California, Appendix A, p. 45.)" (Temescal Water Co. v.
Department of Public Works, 44 Ca1.2d 90, 101 [280 P.2d 1].)
By its terms section 1094.5 applies" for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or
decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law
8 hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be
taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested
in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer." Commission determination of the location of a disputed landmark
or whether a boundary had been mutually recognized or used
for 8 period sufficient to "legally establish" it ( Gov. Code,

)

Mal'. 1958J COUNTY

OF

ALPINE tI. COUNTY OF TUOLUHNB 801
m P.2d "9]

(49 C.1d '187;

§§ 23170,23177) is a quasi.judicial function and accordingly,
in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the require.
ment of a bearing is implied. (Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39
Cal.2d 260, 271 [246 P.2d 656J ; Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Cal.2d
226, 230 [195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.2d 826J; La Prade v.
Department of Water & Power, 27 Ca1.2d 47, 53 [162 P.2d
13]; Steen v. Board of Civil Service Com., 26 Cal.2d 716,
723·725 [160 P.2d 816J ; Carroll v. California Horse Racing
Board, 16 Ca1.2d 164, 168 [105 P.2d 110]; cf., Keeler v.
Superior Court,46 Ca1.2d 596, 599 [297 P.2d 967) ; DiGenova
v. State Board of Education, 45 Cal.2d 255, 259·260 [288
P.2d 862].) Moreover, since the commission has been granted
the power of the head of a department of theBtate under
Government Code, sections 11180 to 11191 (Pub. Res. Code,
§ 6103), it is fully equipped to meet the hearing requirement.
Its powers include the power to make investigations concern·
ing all matters relating to the subjects under its jurisdiction;
to inspect books and records; to hear complaints; to administer
oaths; to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and
the production of papers, books, accounts, documents and
testimony in any inquiry, investigation, hearing or proceeding
pertinent or material thereto in any part of the state; to dele·
gate its investigative and hearing powers to an officer of the
commission; to petition the superior court in the county in
which the hearing is pending for an order compelling witnesses
to attend and testify or produce the papers required; and to
cause the depositions of persons residing within or without
the state to be taken by petitioning the superior court of Sac.
ramento County. Any party to a commission hearing has
the right to the attendance of witnesses in his behalf at the
hearing or upon deposition. Such provisions are adequate
to enable the commission to proceed and they demonstrate that
it has the power sought to be exercised here.
The majority hold, however, that the administrative remedy
"provided by sections 28171·23175 is to be availed of only
where the language of the boundary statute is clear and
only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor in ade·
quately marking the line is required. In other words, where
the language used by the Legislature is 'indefinite or uncertain,' construction of 'such language is a matter exclusively
for the courts, and the location of the boundaries is a question
of fact to be judicially determined." Such a limitation on
the commission's power is unworkable, productive of waste,
and casts a cloud on the validity of all of its detenninations.
.C,Jel__
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Whether the language of the statute is indefinite or uncertain
may appear only after it is sought to be correlated with
objects on the ground. Apparent clarity may disappear only
in the light of extensive surveys undertaken by the commission that will then go for nought, and disputants will bE'
enabled to relitigate settled bouudaries, not because they werE'
erroneously determined. but only because ambiguity in thE'
statutory language can be demonstrated. The applicable
statutes themselves refute any such limitation on the commission's powers.
There is no occasion to invoke sections 23171 to 23175 unless
there is a dispute as to the location of the landmarks and
lines establishing boundaries. Not only are those sections
included in the article of the Government Code entitled ., Settlement of Boundary Disputes" (tit. 3, div. 1, ch. 2, art. 3)
but their very purpose is the settlement of such disputes. If
there is any need to have a boundary Hdefinitely established"
it can arise only because of doubt as to its location, either
because, in the language of section 23171, U all common boundaries and common corners" are U not adequately marked by
natural objects or lines" or because such boundaries and
corners are not adequately marked by U surveys lawfully
made. " It is only because of uncertainty as to the adequacy
of the markings of common boundaries and corners or the
legality of previous surveys that boards of supervisors of
the counties affected are authorized to apply to the commission
and the commission is given jurisdiction definitely to establish
such U common boundaries" and U common corners." Section
23172 explicitly provides for reports by county surveyors "to
the State Lands Commission, with surveys, maps, notes, and
explanations touching disputed points." (Italics added.) If
these reports are insufficient to enable the commission to
collate a satisfactory description therefrom, the commission
Hshall cause surveys to be made, and when approved by it,
the surveys establish the common boundaries and corners."
(Gov. Code, § 23173.) There would be no purpose in report.
ing to the commission about" disputed points" with U surveys,
maps, notes, and explanations" if the commission did not
have power to settle the "disputed points." The commission's
jurisdiction to establish by surveys common boundaries and
corners necessarily includes jurisdiction to determine in the
1irst instance ~he meaning of the statutory language defining
the boundary or the existence of facts bringing into play the
mutual recognition and use statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 23170,
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23177), for only after it has decided such preliminary questions, can a final survey be undertaken. "A public officer
or board has not only the powers expressly enumerated by law,
but also those implied powers which are necessary to thE'
exercise of the powers expressly granted." (Crawford v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist., 200 Cal. 318, 334 [253 P. 726].)
The majority concede that if the language of the boundary
statute were clear, the commission could act upon it to establish a boundary by survey. The power to do so is just as
essential to the commission's function when the language is
unclear, and nothing in the statutes justifies the distinction
that the majority make. It is ironic that the commission is
denied authority to act in the very situations in which the
disputes it is empowered to settle are most likely to arise.
Language in County of Sierra v. County of Nevada, 155 Ca1.
1 [99 P. 371], unquestionably supports the position taken by
the majority herein. In that case, however, the court was
reviewing a judgment that had determined a disputed boundary after a full trial in the trial court. The plaintiff had not
invoked the administrative remedy but after an adverse judgment sought to switch to another tribunal. It may reasonably
be assumed that the court was reluctant to reverse a judgment
entered after a full and accurate determination of the issues
solely because another remedy had not been invoked. In any
event, to sustain its decision it was only necessary for the
court to hold that the administrative remedy was not exclusive.
It was not necessary to hold that the administrative remedy
did not exist. The precise problem there presented is now
governed by statutes allowing the plaintiff an election of
remedies in the first instance (Gov. Code, §§ 51000-51009),
so it is unnecessary to determine whether the court erred in
the Sierra ease in holding in effect that the administrative
remedy was not exclusive. Obviously, however, the language
in that decision indicating that the Legislature could not
constitutionally invest .the State Lands Commission with
authority in the first instance to determine the questions involved in this case should be disapproved. The power to find
facts upon which the application of a statute depends is an
essential part of administrative authority. In 1917 this court
said, "from necessity, if for no better grounded reason, it has
become increasingly imperative that many quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial functions, which in smaller communities
and under more primitive conditions were performed directly
by the legislative or judicial branches of the government, are
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intrusted to departments, boards, commissions, and -llgieu.
No sound objection can longer be successfully advanced to
growing method of transacting public business. These things
must be done in this way or they cannot be done at all, and
their doing, in a very real sense, makes for the safety of the
republic, and is thus sanctioned by the highest law. For, as
the supreme court of the United States declares: 'Indeed, it
is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of the right,
under the Constitution, to delegate the power to determine
some fact or the state of things upon which the enforcement of
its enactment depends, would be "to stop the wheels
government" and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in
the conduct of the public business.'" (Gaylord v. Oity of
PastJdena, 175 Cal. 433, 436-437 [166 P. 348].)
More recent decisions of this court resting on the premise
that "judicial functions" cannot constitutionally be given to
a state-wide agency have at most given a broad scope to
judicial review of agency action. (StM&aard Oil 00. v. State
Board of Equalization, 6 Cal.2d 557 [59 P.2d 119] ; Whitten v.
California State Board of Optometry, 8 Cal.2d 444 [65 P.2d
1296, 115 A.L.R. 11; Drummey v. State Board of Funeral
Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848] ; Bodinson Mfg. 00. v.
California EmpZoyment Oom., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935];
Laisne v. Oalifornia State Board of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831
[123 P.2d 457]; Dare v. Board of Medical Ezaminerl, 21 Cal.
2d 790 [136 P.2d 304]; Sipper v. Urban, 22 Cal.2d 138 [137
P.2d 425]; Moran v. Board of Medical Ezaminers, 32 Cal.2d
301 [196 P.2d 20].) They have not gone so far as to deny:
any administrative agency the power in the 1irst instance to i
pass upon questions of law or fact. Oertainly, 1b:ing the
location of a disputed landmark or determining whether a·
boundary line has been mutually recognized for a sufficient
time legally to establish it is no more an exclusive function
of courts than determining the extent of the penalty for violation of the Insurance Code (Nardoni v. McOonneZl, 48 Cal.
2d 500, 507 [310 P.2d 644]) or determining whether there is
unappropriated water available for an applicant (TemescaZ
Water 00. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Ca1.2d 90,
106 [280 P.2d 1]), to cite but two recent instances in which
this court has upheld the exercise of quasi-judicial power by
a state-wide administrative agency. (See also dissenting
opinion in Laisne v. Califorllia State Board of Optometry, 19
Oal.2d 831,859-862 [123 P.2d 457] and cases cited.) Clearly
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the reasons given for the decision in the Sierra ease were
aberrational, and they should not be given fresh currency now
merely because this is another boundary dispute case.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1958. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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